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The greater they export, the greater employment in the exporting countries. However,
we first document that the number of jobs created per exports varies substantially across
destination countries. We find that exports from sectors with higher domestic value-added
contents such as natural resource, textile, and service sectors lead to a greater employment
effect. As a result, cross-country differences in sectoral compositions of exports explain a
large part of the variations in the employment effects across destination countries. Time
series changes in the employment effect of exports come from changes in (1) the labor-to-
output ratio, (2) input-output linkages, and (3) sectoral compositions in exports. Results
suggest that the first channel worked to reduce the employment effect in all of the three
countries we focused but the directions of the last two channels are different across the
countries.
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1 Introduction
Export opportunities to foreign countries create jobs in exporting countries. Previous liter-
ature finds a substantial employment creation effect of exports using an input-output analysis
(e.g., Los, Timmer, and Vries, 2015, for the impact on China’s employment; Feenstra and Sasa-
hara, 2018, for U.S. employment; Feenstra and Sasahara, 2019 forthcoming, for employment in
Asian countries). However, the employment effect per exports – roughly speaking, productivity
of exports in creating employment – is not explored in the literature. We investigate if the size
of employment generated by exports can be described by a one-to-one mapping from the size
of exports. If so, we do not have to use an input-output analysis to find employment effects of
exports and the total value of exports would be a sufficient statistic to know the employment
effect of exports.
Results from the analysis show that the employment effect of exports is not just the size of
exports and the employment effect per exports varies substantially across destination countries.
Then we further examine why some countries create more jobs per exports than others do.
Results suggests that exports from some sectors such as natural resources, textile, and services
lead to a greater number of jobs than exports from other sectors. This is consistent with
the recent literature on value added in trade, finding a substantial amount of intermediate
good trade in manufacturing industries, making domestic value-added content of manufacturing
exports smaller (e.g., Johnson and Noguera, 2012). Therefore, the employment effect per
exports varies across destination countries primarily due to differences in sectoral composition
of exports. Because countries sell disproportionally more services domestically, domestic final
demand leads to more jobs for the same value of final demand.
Our analyses focus on three major countries in the world, the U.S., China, and Japan where
these countries account for 41% of world GDP and 26% of world merchandise trade as of 2014
(World Bank, 2017) and they have large influences on the world economy. Therefore, it is
critical to understand the employment effect of exports on these countries. Comparing these
three countries, we find that employment effects of foreign final demand per million dollar
exports on China are very different from those on the U.S. and Japan. For example, the
employment effect of foreign final demand per exports on China, relative to the employment
effect of China’s final demand, is increasing over the period 2000-2014 because domestic value-
added contents in China’s exports are rising as shown in previous studies (e.g., Kee and Tang,
2016; Koopman, Z. Wang, and Wei, 2012). On the other hand, the employment effect of exports
relative to that of domestic final demand is slightly declining in the U.S. and Japan.
We also find an interesting result that the three countries differ in sectors in which the
employment creation effects are greater. For example, exports from the textile sector creates
the greatest number of jobs in China while the service sector is the most important for the
U.S. and Japan. This suggests that a country’s development level has a close link with sectoral
contributions in creating jobs. Forward and backward linkages with other countries also affect
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the employment effect of exports. We show that the impact of international production linkages
on the employment effect of exports is complicated. Deeper backward linkages are particularly
complicated as these sometimes lead to job replacement and sometimes boost exports due to an
increase in the number of available intermediate inputs from abroad (see Feng, Li, and Swenson,
2016, for the case in China; Harrison and McMillan, 2011 and Wright, 2016, for the case in the
U.S.).1
Regarding time-series variations in the employment effect of exports, it declined by 30%,
60%, and 5% in the U.S., China, and Japan, respectively, during the period 2000-2014. Time-
series changes in the employment effect of exports per exports are decomposed to changes in (1)
the labor-to-gross output ratio, (2) the sectoral composition in exports, and (3) input-output
linkages. Results suggest that a decrease in the labor-to-gross output ratio — i.e., an increase in
labor productivity — is the biggest reason why the employment effect of exports declined in the
U.S. and China. If a country becomes more productive and one unit of labor produces a greater
amount of output, then it means that a one unit increase in exports requires a fewer number
of labor. We also find that changes in sectoral composition of exports worked to reduce the
employment effect of exports in the U.S. and China. Changes in input-output linkages slightly
reduced the employment effect of exports in the U.S. while it increased the employment effect
of exports in China. We find small time-series variations in the employment effect of exports
in Japan during the same period.
This paper contributes to a growing body of literature on the employment effect of interna-
tional trade, focusing on a positive employment creation effect of exports (e.g., Los, Timmer,
and Vries, 2015, for China; Vianna, 2016, for Latin American countries; Feenstra, Ma, and
Xu, 2017, Feenstra and Sasahara, 2018, Liang, 2018, and Magyari, 2017, for the U.S.; Feenstra
and Sasahara, 2019 forthcoming, and Kiyota, 2016, for Asian countries). Among these studies,
this paper is particularly related with Los, Timmer, and Vries (2015), Feenstra and Sasahara
(2019), Feenstra and Sasahara (2018), and Kiyota (2016) because we also use an input-output
analysis and quantifies the employment effect of foreign final demand.2 We go beyond the
literature by highlighting the fact that the employment effect per exports varies substantially
across destination countries and by explaining the reasons why they differ.
Echoing recent studies investigating implications of value-added contents of trade under
expanding Global Value Chains (hereafter GVCs), we aim to understand how value-added con-
1Feng, Li, and Swenson (2016) show that an increase in imported inputs increased exports from China
because imported inputs have higher quality and led to a positive spillover. Harrison and McMillan (2011)
analyze the data from the U.S. between 1982 and 1999 and find that offshoring to low-wage countries reduced
U.S. manufacturing employment. They also find that offshoring increased employment for firms doing very
different tasks between home and abroad. Wright (2016) examines a direct displacement effect of offshoring,
which works to reduce domestic employment, and a positive productivity effect, which increases employment.
By taking these two effects into account, he finds that offshoring to China increased overall employment by
2.6% during 2001-2007 following China’s accession to the WTO.
2This approach focuses on the demand-side of the labor market only and does not allow general equilibrium
feed backs from the supply-side of the labor market. See, for example, Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro (2015) for
a general equilibrium analysis of the impact of trade on labor markets.
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tents affect the employment effect of exports. Expanding GVCs have a significant implication
on various economic indicators (see Feenstra, 1998; Baldwin, 2012), especially in East Asia
(see Ando and Kimura, 2005; Ando and Kimura, 2014; Kimura and Obashi, 2016; Obashi and
Kimura, 2017).3 Previous studies show that GVCs and value-added contents of trade have
implications on trade imbalances (Johnson and Noguera, 2012), U.S. employment in import-
competing sectors (Shen and Silva, 2018; Shen, Silva, and H. Wang, 2018), business cycle
synchronization (Duval et al., 2016), exchange rates (Bems and Johnson, 2017), trade policies
(Blanchard, Bowen, and Johnson, 2017), Heckscher-Ohlin trade patterns (Ito, Rotunno, and
Vézina, 2017), and geographical distribution of ‘good’ jobs and ‘bad’ jobs (Baldwin, Ito, and
Sato, 2014).
This paper considers an implication of GVCs from a different angle. We investigate whether
GVCs and value-added contents of trade affect the employment creation effect of exports from a
country. This paper is inspired by Feenstra (2017), proposing an idea that value-added contents
of trade are considered as the ‘second generation’ measure of offshoring and suggesting its
implication on labor markets. In terms of focus, the paper is the most closely related with Ito
(2018), examining the effect of expanding GVCs on overall employment. Our focus is similar
but it differs from Ito (2018) because we focus on how deepening GVCs affect the employment
creation effect of exports per value of exports.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section estimates the employment
effect of exports and discusses results. Section 3 finds domestic value-added contents in exports
and consider how these are associated with the employment effect of exports. Section 4 provides
a decomposition exercise in order to understand why the employment effect of exports has
changed over time. Section 5 concludes. Details on data and results from some additional
analyses are summarized in Appendix.
2 Estimating the Employment Effect of Final Demand
2.1 The Method
This section presents the technique we use in order to estimate the employment effect of
final good exports – or final demand in general. We use an input-output approach where it
has a long history since Leontief (1936) and the method is also employed by Los, Timmer, and
Vries (2015) and Feenstra and Sasahara (2018) to quantify the employment effect of exports.
The data come from the WIOD, the 2016 release (Timmer, Dietzenbacher, et al., 2015; Timmer
et al., 2016). It has C = 44 economies including the rest of the world as one economy and each
3Ando and Kimura (2005) document development of international production and distribution networks in
East Asia using the data from 1996-2000. Obashi and Kimura (2017) show deepening and widening of the
production networks in the same region by looking at the number of exported products, destination countries,
and product-destination pairs. Ando and Kimura (2014) highlight the link between East Asia and North
America through machinery trade. Kimura and Obashi (2016) provide a summary of its implications and
related research.
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of them consists of N = 56 sectors. Input-output analyses are conducted using this WIOD
input-output table with C = 44 and N = 56. However, for the sake of simplicity, this section
assumes that there are only two countries – country 1 and country 2, denoted with superscripts
1 and 2, respectively – and each of them has two sectors – the manufacturing and service
sectors, denoted with superscripts M and S, respectively. As a result, C = 2 and N = 2.
This simplifies matrix notations. Although we have a simplified 2× 2 case here, the same logic
applies to a general case with an arbitrary number of countries and sectors. The input-output
table is available annually from 2000 to 2014 so we introduce time subscript t = 2000, 2001, ...,
2014.
Table 1 shows a simplified two country and two sector input-output table. The 4 × 4
symmetric matrix in the left side of the table describes intermediate good flows. For example,
m
(1,M),(2,S)
t measures the value of intermediate good flows from the manufacturing sector of
country 1 to the service sector of country 2. The last two columns indicated by d’s describe final
good flows. For example, d(1,M),2 denotes the value of final goods produced in the manufacturing
sector and purchased by country 2. Using these, we find input-output coefficients:
At︸︷︷︸
(C×N)×(C×N)
=

a
(1,M),(1,M)
t a
(1,M),(1,S)
t a
(1,M),(2,M)
t a
(1,M),(2,S)
t
a
(1,S),(1,M)
t a
(1,S),(1,S)
t a
(1,S),(2,M)
t a
(1,S),(2,S)
t
a
(2,M),(1,M)
t a
(2,M),(1,S)
t a
(2,M),(2,M)
t a
(2,M),(2,S)
t
a
(2,S),(1,M)
t a
(2,S),(1,S)
t a
(2,S),(2,M)
t a
(2,S),(2,S)
t
 ,
where
a(i,s),(j,r) = m(i,s),(j,r)/yj,r,
with gross production in sector r of country j, yj,rt =
∑
s∈{M,S}
∑C
i=1m
(j,r),(i,s)
t +
∑C
i=1 d
(j,r),i
t .
Table 1: Simplified Two Country × Two Sector Input-Output Table
Country 1 Country 2 Country 1 Country 2
Manuf. Services Manuf. Services Final Final
Country 1, Manufacturing m(1,M),(1,M)t m
(1,M),(1,S)
t m
(1,M),(2,M)
t m
(1,M),(2,S)
t d
(1,M),1
t d
(1,M),2
t
Country 1, Services m(1,S),(1,M)t m
(1,S),(1,S)
t m
(1,S),(2,M)
t m
(1,S),(2,S)
t d
(1,S),1
t d
(1,S),2
t
Country 2, Manufacturing m(2,M),(1,M)t m
(2,M),(1,S)
t m
(2,M),(2,M)
t m
(2,M),(2,S)
t d
(2,M),1
t d
(2,M),2
t
Country 2, Services m(2,S),(1,M)t m
(2,S),(1,S)
t m
(2,S),(2,M)
t m
(2,S),(2,S)
t d
(2,S),1
t d
(2,S),2
t
Suppose country 1 is home and country 2 is a foreign country. We are interested in the
effect of final demand from country 2 to country 1 on country 1’s employment. The employment
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effect of the final demand is estimated as4
L(1,All),2t ≡ Λt(I−At)−1Dt −Λt(I−At)−1D∗(1,All),2t , (1)
where
Dt︸︷︷︸
(C×N)×1
≡

d
(1,M),1
t + d
(1,M),2
t
d
(1,S),1
t + d
(1,S),2
t
d
(2,M),1
t + d
(2,M),2
t
d
(2,S),1
t + d
(2,S),2
t
 and D
∗(1,All),2
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C×N)×1
≡

d
(1,M),1
t + 0
d
(1,S),1
t + 0
d
(2,M),1
t + d
(2,M),2
t
d
(2,S),1
t + d
(2,S),2
t
 ,
and Λt is a (C×N)×(C×N) matrix with the labor-to-gross production ratio in diagonal entries
and zeros in off-diagonal entries. Dt denotes a (C ×N)× 1 matrix describing final good flows.
In the hypothetical final demand vector D∗(1,All),2t , final demands from country 2 to country 1
represented in d(1,M),2t and d
(1,S),2)
t are replaced with zeros. Superscript “(1, All), 2” indicates
that this computation leads to the employment effect on country 1 generated by country 2’s final
demands to country 1’s all sectors. The estimated employment effect is a (C ×N)× 1 vector,
L(1,All),2t =
[
L
(1,M)
t |(1,All),2, L(1,S)t |(1,All),2, L(2,M)t |(1,All),2, L(2,S)t |(1,All),2
]′
. The overall employment
effect of country 2’s final demands to country 1 on country 1 is L(1,M)t |(1,All),2 + L(1,S)t |(1,All),2,
the employment effect on country 1’s manufacturing sector plus the one on country 1’s service
sector. Note that this approach estimates the employment effect of exports from one country
to another, which does not include the impact of foreign final demand through other foreign
countries - so-called the third county effects.5
A greater final demand implies a greater employment effect. We are interested in whether
this employment effect is merely another measure of size of final demand. Therefore, we find
4The exact approach employed by Los, Timmer, and Vries (2015) is what they call the demand-side analysis
— the employment effect of exports from country 1 to country 2 is estimated as Λt(I −At)−1D˜(1,All),2t where
D˜(1,All),2t = Dt − D∗(1,All),2t . The approach we employ here is the ‘hypothetical extraction’ technique (e.g.,
Los, Timmer, and De Vries, 2016), which measures the difference between the actual employment level and
the counterfactual employment when there were no foreign demand from country 2. These two approaches
give the exact same estimates regarding the domestic employment component in exports. One difference is
that the ‘hypothetical extraction’ approach does not give foreign employment components for each of foreign
countries and only lead to domestic contents. In Feenstra and Sasahara (2019), the demand-side analysis and
the ‘hypothetical extraction’ technique led to slightly different results because they do not zeroing exports and
instead they replaced with exports from the benchmark year. See section 2.2.2 of Johnson (2018) for further
clarification.
5Another difference between the current approach and the approach employed by Los, Timmer, and Vries
(2015) and Feenstra and Sasahara (2019) is that these studies examine the employment effect of total foreign final
demand including final demand from foreign countries to other foreign countries. Therefore, their estimation
takes the employment effect through third countries into account. For example, final demand from China to
Japan has an employment effect on the U.S. through input demand from Japan to the U.S. in order to produce
goods sold from Japan to China. However, we do not consider such third country effects here. We only consider
the employment effect through bilateral exports from a country to another country on the exporting country
as Feenstra and Sasahara (2018) consider the employment impact of gross exports from the U.S. to foreign
countries.
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the employment effect divided by the value of final demand:
l
(1,M)
t |(1,All),k ≡
L
(1,M)
t |(1,All),k + L(1,S)t |(1,All),k
d
(1,M),k
t + d
(1,S),k
t
, for k = 1, 2.
For example, l(1,M)t |(1,All),2 is the per final demand employment effect of country 2’s aggregate
final demand to country 1 on country 1 as a whole. Subscript All indicates that exports from
all sectors in country 1 is taken into account.
2.2 Sectoral Linkages of the Employment Effect
The employment effect of exports presented in the previous section quantifies the impact
of a country’s aggregate exports on employment in each sector in the exporting country. In
order to see how sectoral linkages generate employment, we explore the employment effect by
disaggregating the employment effects at the sector level.
The employment effect of country 2’s final demand to country 1’s manufacturing sector is
found as:
L(1,M),2t ≡ Λt(I−At)−1Dt −Λt(I−At)−1D∗(1,M),2t , (2)
where
D∗(1,M),2t︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C×N)×1
≡

d
(1,M),1
t + 0
d
(1,S),1
t + d
(1,S),2
t
d
(2,M),1
t + d
(2,M),2
t
d
(2,S),1
t + d
(2,S),2
t
 .
Under this hypothetical final demand D˜(1,M),2t , only country 2’s final demand to country 1’s
manufacturing sector d(1,M),2t is replaced with zero and country 2’s final demand to country 1’s
service sector d(1,S),2t is kept as it is. The estimated employment effect is a vector L(1,M),2t =[
L
(1,M)
t |(1,M),2, L(1,S)t |(1,M),2, L(2,M)t |(1,M),2, L(2,S)t |(1,M),2
]′
. The first element L(1,M)t |(1,M),2 measures
the effect of impact of country 2’s final demand to country 1’s manufacturing sector on country
1’s manufacturing sector – the direct effect on its own sector. The second element L(1,S)t |(1,M),2
quantifies the effect of impact of country 2’s final demand to country 1’s manufacturing sector
on country 1’s service sector – the indirect effect through input-output linkages.
These estimated employment effects are normalized by dividing by final demand flows as
follows:
l
(1,M)
t |(1,M),k ≡
L
(1,M)
t |(1,M),k
d
(1,M),k
t
and l(1,S)t |(1,M),k ≡
L
(1,S)
t |(1,M),k
d
(1,M),k
t
, for k = 1, 2
where the former is the per final demand employment effect of country k’s final demand to
country 1’s manufacturing sector on country 1’s manufacturing sector and the latter is the per
final demand employment effect of country k’s final demand country 1’s manufacturing sector
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on country 1’s service sector.
2.3 Estimated Employment Effects
We first present the employment effect of exports at the destination country-level for the
U.S., China, and Japan, respectively. Table 2 reports the estimated impacts of final demand
from 10 contributors to U.S. employment. The first three columns report the result for U.S.
total exports and the last three columns describe the ones for U.S. merchandise exports, only.
Column (1) shows that final demands from Canada, China, and Mexico, contribute to the U.S.
to create 624 thousand, 263 thousand, and 246 thousand jobs, respectively. These countries
have greater employment effects on the U.S. because U.S. exports to these countries are greater
– U.S. exports to Canada, China, and Mexico are 104 billion, 46 billion, and 42 billion USD,
respectively (see column (2)). In order to see if the size of employment effects is fully explained
by the size of exports, column (3) displays the employment effect per million dollar exports. It
shows that the employment effect per exports varies substantially across destination countries.
For example, a million dollar exports to Netherlands create 7.69 jobs while the same value of
exports to France leads to 6.16 jobs only. It also shows that a million dollar domestic final
demand creates 8.56 jobs on average. Foreign final demand creates, on average, 6.07 jobs per
million dollar final demand. Therefore, final demands from foreign countries lead to about
100× (8.56− 6.07)/8.56 = 29 percent less jobs than U.S. domestic final demand for the same
value of final demand.6
However, this gap disappears once we focus on final demand to merchandise sectors only.
Column (4) in Table 1 report the employment impact of merchandise final demand. The value of
merchandise final demand and the employment effect per million dollar final demand are shown
in columns (5) and (6), respectively. A million dollar domestic final demands to merchandise
goods lead to 5.32 jobs while that from foreign countries generate 5.55 jobs on average, which is
slightly greater than the domestic employment effect. It suggests that final demand for services
create more jobs and the U.S. exports merchandise goods disproportionally more than services
comparing with U.S. sales to its domestic market.
Table 3 shows results from China as an exporter. Column (1) shows that final demands
from the U.S., Japan, and Russia, contribute to China to create 13 million, 7 million, and 4
million jobs, respectively. In terms employment effects per million dollar final demand, Russia
creates the largest number of jobs, 90.49, and the U.S. has the smallest number, 63.78, among
6One may ask if these numbers are reasonable. Johnson and Noguera (2012) find that the value added ratio
of U.S. exports is 77% using the data from 2004. Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2013) report that the labor share
in the U.S. is 58.3%. These numbers imply that a million dollar exports lead to 1 million × 0.77 × 0.583 =
449 thousand dollars labor compensation. We find that a million dollar foreign final demand creates 8.46 jobs
on average. The labor compensation 449 thousand dollars dividend by 8.46 persons is equal to 53.07 thousand
dollars per worker. The median annual household income in 2014 was 53.66 thousand dollars (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2014), which is close to our estimates, 53.07 thousand dollars. These computations confirm that our
estimation results are reasonable.
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Table 2: The Impact of Final Demand from Top 10 Contributors on U.S. Employment, 2014
Final demand to all sectors Final demand to merchandise sectors
Employment Final good Employment Employment Final good Employment
effect demand effect per effect demand effect per
(thousand (million million USD (thousand (million million USD
jobs) USD) (jobs) jobs) USD) (jobs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 Canada 624.24 104,186 5.99 542.04 94,180 5.76
(0.42) (0.59) (3.75) (3.49)
2 China 263.37 45,595 5.78 221.17 39,680 5.57
(0.18) (0.26) (1.53) (1.47)
3 Mexico 245.50 42,426 5.79 229.07 39,878 5.74
(0.17) (0.24) (1.59) (1.48)
4 The U.K. 201.75 34,078 5.92 131.45 24,517 5.36
(0.14) (0.19) (0.91) (0.91)
5 Germany 178.26 29,204 6.10 95.77 17,685 5.42
(0.12) (0.17) (0.66) (0.66)
6 Japan 138.14 22,265 6.20 115.01 18,886 6.09
(0.09) (0.13) (0.80) (0.70)
7 France 100.68 16,357 6.16 34.08 7,918 4.30
(0.07) (0.09) (0.24) (0.29)
8 South Korea 90.48 13,683 6.61 52.16 8,832 5.91
(0.06) (0.08) (0.36) (0.33)
9 Netherlands 87.50 11,375 7.69 30.06 5,562 5.40
(0.06) (0.06) (0.21) (0.21)
10 Australia 72.79 12,356 5.89 52.02 9,198 5.66
(0.05) (0.07) (0.36) (0.34)
The U.S. 144,500.00 16,879,829 8.56 12,168.00 2,286,125 5.32
(97.28) (96.20) (84.23) (84.77)
Foreign 4,044.77 666,089 6.07 2,278.17 410,629 5.55
(2.72) (3.80) (15.77) (15.23)
Notes: The table reports the employment effect of final demand from 10 contributors for the U.S. in 2014.
Columns (1) and (2) report the employment effect of and final demand from each of top 10 contributors,
respectively. Column (3) shows the employment effect per million dollar final demand. Columns (4)-(6) present
the same variables as for columns (1)-(3), respectively, but focusing on merchandise exports only. The ten
countries are shown in descending order based on the aggregate employment effect reported in column (1).
Numbers in parentheses are the share of the employment effect (or final demand) to the overall value.
the top 10 countries.7 A million dollar final demand from foreign countries as a whole creates
64.81 jobs while the same value of domestic final demand leads to 76.56 jobs. Hence, final
demands from foreign countries lead to about 100 × (76.56 − 64.81)/64.81 = 18 percent less
jobs than U.S. domestic final demand for the same value of final demand. This result is similar
to the one from the U.S.
Columns (4)-(6) show the employment effect of final demand to merchandise sectors. Con-
7China has relatively large numbers of employment effect per million dollar final demand. A million dollar
domestic final demand creates 8.56 jobs in the U.S. while the same value of domestic final demand in China
leads to 76.56 jobs, which is 13 times greater than that of the U.S. There are two reasons for this. First, income
per capita is lower in China compared with the U.S. According to the data from PWT (Feenstra, Inklaar, and
Timmer, 2015), GDP per capita in the U.S. is five times greater than that of China in 2014. Second, Chinese
economy is more labor intensive than the U.S. The data from the WIOD show that the labor-to-output ratio
in China is four times greater than that of the U.S. in 2014.
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Table 3: The Impact of Final Demand from Top 10 Contributors on China’s Employment, 2014
Final demand to all sectors Final demand to merchandise sectors
Employment Final good Employment Employment Final good Employment
effect demand effect per effect demand effect per
(thousand (million million USD (thousand (million million USD
jobs) USD) (jobs) jobs) USD) (jobs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 The U.S. 13,844 217,064 63.78 13,644 213,094 64.03
(1.74) (2.06) (4.58) (5.51)
2 Japan 7,099 105,415 67.35 7,025 104,379 67.30
(0.89) (1.00) (2.36) (2.70)
3 Russia 4,345 48,015 90.49 4,336 47,853 90.62
(0.55) (0.45) (1.46) (1.24)
4 Germany 2,873 46,635 61.61 2,815 45,619 61.70
(0.36) (0.44) (0.94) (1.18)
5 The U.K. 2,104 29,836 70.52 2,040 29,279 69.68
(0.26) (0.28) (0.68) (0.76)
6 South Korea 1,824 27,685 65.87 1,772 26,806 66.10
(0.23) (0.26) (0.59) (0.69)
7 Canada 1,732 24,497 70.69 1,566 23,155 67.61
(0.22) (0.23) (0.53) (0.60)
8 Australia 1,634 25,067 65.20 1,560 24,222 64.39
(0.21) (0.24) (0.52) (0.63)
9 France 1,267 19,579 64.71 1,137 17,345 65.58
(0.16) (0.19) (0.38) (0.45)
10 India 1,264 19,670 64.27 970 17,996 53.87
(0.16) (0.19) (0.33) (0.47)
China 715,680 9,347,750 76.56 228,800 2,786,059 82.12
(90.10) (88.51) (76.77) (72.01)
Foreign 78,622 1,213,131 64.81 69,231 1,082,778 63.94
(9.90) (11.49) (23.23) (27.99)
Notes: The table reports the employment effect of final demand from 10 contributors for the U.S. in 2014.
Columns (1) and (2) report the employment effect of and final demand from each of top 10 contributors j,
respectively. Column (3) shows the employment effect per million dollar final demand. Columns (4)-(6) present
the same variables as for columns (1)-(3), respectively, but focusing on merchandise exports only. The ten
countries are shown in descending order based on the aggregate employment effect reported in column (1).
Numbers in parentheses are the share of the employment effect (or final demand) to the overall value.
trary to the U.S. case, the gap between domestic and foreign employment creation effect is
still present even after restricting our focus on the merchandise sectors. Interestingly, the gap
between the two becomes even greater. A million dollar domestic final demand to China’s mer-
chandise sectors create 82.12 jobs while foreign final demand to the same sectors leads to 63.94
— the gap is 100×(82.12−63.94)/63.94 = 28 percent. This implies that service sectors in China
do not have much greater value added content and/or service sectors are less labor-intensive in
China. Furthermore, it suggests that there are some merchandise sectors that create more jobs
and sell disproportionally more to abroad.
Lastly, Table 4 shows results from Japan. The U.S., China, and Taiwan are top three
contributors for Japan — leading to 546 thousand, 449 thousand, and 96 thousand jobs, re-
spectively. In terms of the number of jobs per million dollar final demand, Taiwan has the
10
Table 4: The Impact of Final Demand from Top 10 Contributors on Japan’s Employment, 2014
Final demand to all sectors Final demand to merchandise sectors
Employment Final good Employment Employment Final good Employment
effect demand effect per effect demand effect per
(thousand (million million USD (thousand (million million USD
jobs) USD) (jobs) jobs) USD) (jobs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 The U.S. 546 59,912 9.11 536 59,057 9.07
(0.96) (1.30) (5.96) (7.17)
2 China 449 45,056 9.96 435 44,014 9.88
(0.79) (0.98) (4.84) (5.34)
3 Taiwan 96 9,176 10.50 85 8,306 10.18
(0.17) (0.20) (0.94) (1.01)
4 Russia 93 10,640 8.75 93 10,624 8.75
(0.16) (0.23) (1.03) (1.29)
5 Rep. of Korea 80 8,301 9.67 76 8,054 9.42
(0.14) (0.18) (0.84) (0.98)
6 Germany 80 7,980 9.97 75 7,629 9.88
(0.14) (0.17) (0.84) (0.93)
7 Australia 68 8,279 8.26 68 8,244 8.24
(0.12) (0.18) (0.75) (1.00)
8 Canada 43 4,657 9.24 42 4,566 9.15
(0.08) (0.10) (0.46) (0.55)
9 Mexico 36 3,718 9.76 35 3,638 9.56
(0.06) (0.08) (0.39) (0.44)
10 The U.K. 35 3,518 10.04 31 3,258 9.41
(0.06) (0.08) (0.34) (0.40)
Japan 53,661 4,285,776 12.52 6,534 561,858 11.63
(94.38) (92.93) (72.67) (68.20)
Foreign 3,194 326,213 9.79 2,458 261,974 9.38
(5.62) (7.07) (27.33) (31.80)
Notes: The table reports the employment effect of final demand from 10 contributors for the U.S. in 2014.
Columns (1) and (2) report the employment effect of and final demand from each of top 10 contributors j,
respectively. Column (3) shows the employment effect per million dollar final demand. Columns (4)-(6) present
the same variables as for columns (1)-(3), respectively, but focusing on merchandise exports only. The ten
countries are shown in descending order based on the aggregate employment effect reported in column (1).
Numbers in parentheses are the share of the employment effect (or final demand) to the overall value.
greatest number, 10.50, and Australia has the smallest number, 8.26, among the top 10 con-
tributors. A million dollar final demand from foreign countries as a whole leads to 9.79 jobs
while that from Japan creates 12.52 jobs. The gap is 100 × (12.52 − 9.79)/9.79 = 28 per-
cent. Restricting our focus on merchandise sectors makes the gap smaller but the gap does not
become zero — 100× (11.63− 9.38)/9.38 = 24 percent.
Guided by these observations, we look at the employment effects of final demand at the
country-sector level. Before going to that direction, we show how the employment effect of
final demand from various countries evolved over the period 2000-2014 because the previous
results only come from static cross-sectional observations in 2014.
Figure 1 describes the employment effects of final demand from various countries between
2000 and 2014 for the U.S. (Panel A), China (Panel B), and Japan (Panel C). The employment
11
effects of country j on country i are first normalized by dividing by the value of final demand
from country j to country i, ∑Ns=1 L(i,s),jt |(i,All),j/∑Ns=1 d(i,s),jt . This measure varies over time
due to various factors such as inflation because input-output tables are constructed in nominal
values. In order to eliminate the effect of inflation, ∑Ns=1 L(i,s),jt |(i,All),j/∑Ns=1 d(i,s),jt is divided by
the impact of domestic final demand, ∑Ns=1 L(i,s),it |(i,All),i/∑Ns=1 d(i,s),it . As a result, the impacts
of final demand from the U.S., China, and Japan are normalized as unity in Panels A, B, and
C, respectively.
Figure 1: Employment Effect of Final Good Demand by Destination Country
Panel A: The U.S. Panel B: China
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Panel C: Japan
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Notes: Panels A-C in the figure display the employment effect of final good exports per value of final good
exports on the U.S., China, and Japan, respectively. The employment effect per exports are normalized by
dividing by the employment effect per domestic final demand. As a result, in Panels A-C, the employment
effect of the U.S., China, and Japan are normalized as unity.
Panel A shows that almost all countries have a smaller employment creation effect relative to
the U.S. — one exception is Sweden in early 2000’s. It also shows that Sweden and Netherlands
have relatively greater employment creation effects and Slovenia has an exceptionally lower
employment creation effect for the U.S. — the employment effect of Slovenia is 50% less than
that of U.S. domestic final demand for the same value of final demand in 2014. Overall, there
12
is a slight downward trend in the employment effects of foreign demand.
Time-series changes of employment effects on China are presented in Panel B. Contrary to
the U.S., there is an upward trend. The median gap between domestic and foreign employment
effect was 30% in early 2000’s but it is 20% in 2014. This upward trend in the foreign employ-
ment effects is probably driven by a rise in domestic value added contents in China’s exports
as documented in previous studies (e.g., Kee and Tang, 2016; Xikang et al., 2012). Russia has
an exceptionally high employment effect on China — even greater than the effect of China’s
domestic final demand and Czech Republic has the lowest employment effect for China.
Panel C presents results from Japan, showing that there is a slight declining trend in foreign
employment effects, which is similar to the result from the U.S. Also, contrary to the U.S. and
China, the employment effects on Japan are strongly affected by the 2008-09 Great Trade
Collapse, resulting in a temporary hike in the foreign employment effects in 2009.8
2.4 Employment Effects and Sectoral Linkages
The last set of analyses in this section is to look at the employments effect at the sectoral
level and clarifies sectoral linkages to see if there are any differences between the employment
effects of domestic and foreign final demands. The input-output table from the WIOD has 56
sectors and we aggregate them to three broad sectors, the natural resource, sectors 1-4, the
manufacturing sector, sectors 5-22, and the service sector, sectors 23-56.9
Table 5 reports results from the U.S. where Panels A and B display the employment effects
of domestic final demand and foreign final demand, respectively. Panel A shows that, for
example, a million dollar domestic final demand to natural resources leads to 2.57 jobs, 0.27
jobs, and 1.47 jobs in the natural resource, manufacturing, and service sectors, respectively,
totaling 4.31 jobs. It shows that there are considerable linkages from the natural resource sector
to the service sector, and from the manufacturing sector to the service sector.10 However, there
is little linkages from the service sector to the other two sectors.
Comparing with Panels A and B, sectoral job creation effects of final demands are similar
between domestic and foreign final demand — a million dollar domestic final demand leads to
4.31, 5.44, and 9.07 jobs in the natural resource, manufacturing, and service sectors, respec-
tively, while a million dollar foreign final demand create 7.53, 5.47, and 6.92 jobs in the same
sectors, respectively. However, the sectoral composition of domestic final demand and foreign
final demand is strikingly different — 86% of domestic final demand goes to the service sector
while 60% of foreign demand are for the manufacturing sector (see column (6)). Because service
8There are two possible explanations for this. First, exports from all sectors declined substantially but there
was not much adjustment in employment, resulting in a substantial hike in employment-to-output ratio. An
analysis presented in Section 4 confirms it is actually the case. Second, presumably there is a disproportional
decline in exports from sectors with greater value added content.
9We conduct input-output computation using the original disaggregated data and then estimation results
are aggregated after the input-output computation.
10This is consistent with Kiyota (2016)’s finding that service sectors’ employment is largely depending upon
other tradable sectors in the context of employment effects of exports on China, Japan, Indonesia, and Korea.
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Table 5: The Impact of Final Demand on U.S. Employment and Sectoral Linkages, 2014
Panel A: Domestic Final Demand
Employment creation in Resource Manuf. Services Total Final demand
(jobs) (jobs) (jobs) (jobs) (million USD) (share)
A million dollar final demand to (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Resource 2.57 0.27 1.47 4.31 239,806 0.01
Manufacturing 0.51 2.78 2.15 5.44 2,046,319 0.12
Services 0.05 0.26 8.76 9.07 14,593,704 0.86
Total 16,879,829 1
Weighted average of the employment effects,
∑3
s=1 Col(4)s × Col(6)s = 8.56
Panel B: Foreign Final Demand
Employment creation in Resource Manuf. Services Total Final demand
(jobs) (jobs) (jobs) (jobs) (million USD) (share)
A million dollar final demand to (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Resource 5.66 0.40 1.47 7.53 14,280 0.02
Manufacturing 0.30 3.10 2.07 5.47 396,349 0.60
Services 0.03 0.19 6.69 6.92 255,460 0.38
Total 666,089 1
Weighted average of the employment effects,
∑3
s=1 Col(4)s × Col(6)s = 6.07
Notes: The table reports the employment effect of domestic final demand (Panel A), foreign final demand
(Panel B) on the U.S. in 2014. The input-output computation is done using the original WIOD input-output
table with 56 sectors and 44 economies, and then the employment effects in the WIOD 56 sectors are aggregated
into the three aggregate sectors: the natural resource sector, the manufacturing sector, and the service sector.
Table 6: The Impact of Final Demand on China’s Employment and Sectoral Linkages, 2014
Panel A: Domestic Final Demand
Employment creation in Resource Manuf. Services Total Final demand
(jobs) (jobs) (jobs) (jobs) (million USD) (share)
A million dollar final demand to (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Resource 149.18 4.19 6.65 160.02 453,306 0.05
Manufacturing 27.51 23.01 16.47 66.99 2,332,753 0.25
Services 9.11 8.54 56.55 74.20 6,561,691 0.70
Total 9,347,750 1
Weighted average of the employment effects,
∑3
s=1 Col(4)s × Col(6)s = 76.56
Panel B: Foreign Final Demand
Employment creation in Resource Manuf. Services Total Final demand
(jobs) (jobs) (jobs) (jobs) (million USD) (share)
A million dollar final demand to (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Resource 114.46 4.65 8.02 127.13 11,926 0.01
Manufacturing 15.83 30.93 16.48 63.23 1,070,852 0.88
Services 6.02 4.74 61.29 72.05 130,353 0.11
Total 1,213,131 1
Weighted average of the employment effects,
∑3
s=1 Col(4)s × Col(6)s = 64.81
Notes: The table reports the employment effect of domestic final demand (Panel A), foreign final demand
(Panel B) on China in 2014. Also see the notes on Table 5.
sectors have greater domestic value added contents (e.g., Johnson and Noguera, 2012; Johnson,
2014), exports from those sectors lead to a greater employment creation effect there. As a
result, differences in sectoral composition of final demand explain the gap between domestic
and foreign employment effects.
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Table 7: The Impact of Final Demand on Japan’s Employment and Sectoral Linkages, 2014
Panel A: Domestic Final Demand
Employment creation in Resource Manuf. Services Total Final demand
(jobs) (jobs) (jobs) (jobs) (million USD) (share)
A million dollar final demand to (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Resource 31.45 1.23 2.23 34.91 28,263 0.01
Manufacturing 2.01 5.58 2.82 10.40 533,595 0.12
Services 0.22 0.76 11.67 12.66 3,723,918 0.87
Total 4,285,776 1
Weighted average of the employment effects,
∑3
s=1 Col(4)s × Col(6)s = 12.52
Panel B: Foreign Final Demand
Employment creation in Resource Manuf. Services Total Final demand
(jobs) (jobs) (jobs) (jobs) (million USD) (share)
A million dollar final demand to (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Resource 11.85 0.83 2.23 14.90 914 0.003
Manufacturing 0.20 6.07 3.10 9.36 261,060 0.800
Services 0.12 0.51 10.84 11.47 64,239 0.197
Total 326,213 1
Weighted average of the employment effects,
∑3
s=1 Col(4)s × Col(6)s = 9.79
Notes: The table reports the employment effect of domestic final demand (Panel A), foreign final demand
(Panel B) on Japan in 2014. See the notes on Table 5.
Table 6 displays sectoral employment effects in China — where Panels A and B show the
employment effects from domestic final demand and foreign final demand, respectively. Com-
paring column (6) in the two panels, again there is a stark difference in sectoral compositions in
the final demand from domestic and foreign markets — 70% of the domestic final demand goes
to the service sector while 88% is going to the manufacturing sector. This is in part respon-
sible for the gap between the domestic and foreign employment effects. Another interesting
observation is that a million dollar domestic final demand to the natural sector create a signifi-
cantly greater jobs in the same sector compared with foreign final demand — 149.18 jobs versus
114.46. This gap is the reason why there is a large difference between the employment effect
of domestic and foreign final demands in China even after restricting our focus on merchandise
sectors.
Sectoral employment effects in Japan are presented in Table 7. Comparing column (4) in
Panels A and B, there is no sectoral difference in the employment effects in the manufacturing
and the service sector across domestic and foreign final demands. However, there is a large
difference in the employment effects in the natural resource sector between domestic and foreign
demand — 34.91 versus 14.90. This is similar to the case from China.
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3 Domestic Value-Added Content and the Employment
Effect of Exports
This section presents the techniques we use to estimate the employment effect exports, using
a two country-two sector case. Then we examine how it is related with the employment effect
of exports. We follow the literature and use two approaches.11 The first approach is the one
employed by Timmer et al. (2013), Timmer, Erumban, et al. (2014), and Los, Timmer, and
Vries (2015). It measures value-added contents in exports as follows:12

vaxT 1,Mt |(1,All),2
vaxT 1,St |(1,All),2
vaxT 2,Mt |(1,All),2
vaxT 2,St |(1,All),2
 = vt(I−At)
−1

d
(1,M),2
t
d
(1,S),2
t
0
0
 , (3)
where vt is a (C × N) × (C × N) matrix containing the value-added to gross output ratio as
diagonal elements and zeros as off diagonal elements. Estimated value-added contents in the
left hand side include domestic and foreign value-added contents. For example, vaxT 1,Mt |(1,All),2
is the value-added from country 1’s manufacturing sector embodied in aggregate exports from
country 1 to country 2. Subscript “(1, All), 2” indicates that it is aggregate exports from country
1 to country 2. Therefore, overall domestic value-added contents in aggregate exports from
country 1 to country 2 is found as vaxT 1,Mt |(1,All),2 + vaxT 1,St |(1,All),2 and the share of domestic
value-added in gross final good exports is
DV AXT 1,2t ≡
vaxT 1,Mt |(1,All),2 + vaxT 1,St |(1,All),2
d
(1,M),2
t + d
(1,S),2
t
. (4)
Johnson (2018) calls this a decomposition of GVC income. We refer to equation (4) as the
domestic value-added contents based on Timmer et al. and it is denoted as DV AXT .
The second approach is the one employed by Johnson and Noguera (2012), Koopman,
Z. Wang, and Wei (2014), and Los, Timmer, and Vries (2016). While the previous approach
gives value-added contents embodied in final good exports, this approach considers value-added
11See Johnson (2018) for a summary of various approaches estimating value-added contents in final good or
total (including final and intermediate goods) exports using a global input-output table. We follow the summary
in Johnson (2018).
12To be precise, they also include final demand from country 1’s domestic market as well. In their measure,
d
(1,M),2
t in equation (3) is replaced with d
(1,M),1
t + d
(1,M),2
t and d
(1,S),2
t is replaced with d
(1,S),1
t + d
(1,S),2
t . We
are interested in value-added contents in exports so we do not include domestic final demand.
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contents in total exports, including final and intermediate good exports. It is estimated as:
vaxJN1,Mt |(1,All),2
vaxJN1,St |(1,All),2
vaxJN2,Mt |(1,All),2
vaxJN2,St |(1,All),2
 = vt(I−A
∗
t )−1

∑2
r=1m
(1,M),(2,r)
t + d
(1,M),2
t∑2
r=1m
(1,S),(2,r)
t + d
(1,S),2
t
0
0
 , (5)
where
A∗t︸︷︷︸
(C×N)×(C×N)
≡
 A11t 0
A21t A22t
 .
As in the previous measure, estimated value-added contents in the left hand side include do-
mestic and foreign value-added contents. For example, vaxJN1,Mt |(1,All),2 is value-added from
country 1’s manufacturing sector required to produce gross exports from country 1 to country
2. Overall domestic value-added contents required to produce gross exports from country 1 to
country 2 is therefore vaxJN1,Mt |(1,All),2 + vaxJN1,St |(1,All),2 and its share in gross exports is
DV AXJN 1,2t ≡
vaxJN1,Mt |(1,All),2 + vaxJN1,St |(1,All),2∑2
r=1m
(1,M),(2,r)
t + d
(1,M),2
t +
∑2
r=1m
(1,S),(2,r)
t + d
(1,S),2
t
. (6)
We refer to equation (6) as the domestic value-added contents based on Johnson-Noguera and
it is denoted as DV AXJN .
Figure 2 shows sectoral composition of domestic value-added contents in aggregate exports
from each of the three countries to all other foreign countries in 2014. Because these value-added
contents are computed for aggregate exports, these include value-added driven by direct exports
from each of these sectors and indirect effect through sectoral linkages. Service sectors such
as construction and infrastructure supply and wholesale and retail services have higher value-
added contents in all of the three countries. This result is consistent with previous findings (e.g.,
Baldwin, Forslid, and Ito, 2015).13 One unique aspect of the U.S. is that domestic value-added
contents from professional services is higher than China and Japan. In China, natural resource
and service sectors have greater domestic value-added contents than manufacturing sectors,
consistent with previous work (e.g., Koopman, Z. Wang, and Wei, 2012; Ma, Z. Wang, and Zhu,
2015; and Xikang et al., 2012). Some manufacturing industries such as electronics and textile
have greater domestic value-added contents. In Japan, manufacturing sectors overall have a
small domestic value-added contents probably due to the fact that Japan imports a greater
value of intermediate inputs for these sectors. To summarize, there is strong heterogeneity in
domestic value-added contents across sectors within a country.
While Figure 2 displays a snapshot of sectoral composition of domestic value-added in 2014,
13Baldwin, Forslid, and Ito (2015) highlight contribution of service sectors in providing value-added in exports
from Asian countries. They find that transport, wholesale and retail services are particularly contributing in
adding value-added in exports.
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Figure 2: Sectoral Compositions of Domestic Value-Added Content in Exports
Panel A: The U.S. Panel B: China
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Panel C: Japan
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Notes: The figure shows sectoral composition of domestic value-added contents in a country’s aggregate exports
to all foreign countries in 2014. WIOD 56 sectors are aggregated to eleven major sectors. See Appendix for
aggregation of sectors.
Figure 3 shows domestic value-added contents embodied in exports to each of the destination
countries during the period 2000-2014. The same countries as Figure 1 are highlighted to see the
link between the employment effect of exports and domestic value-added contents. The figure
shows striking differences across the three countries in terms of long-run trend in domestic value-
added contents in exports. In the U.S., domestic value-added content is slightly declining over
the period 2000-2014 and it is almost flat after 2011. In China, domestic value-added content
is declining between 2000 and 2004 but it is increasing after 2007. This overall increasing trend
in China’s domestic value-added contents in exports is consistent with previous research (e.g.,
Kee and Tang, 2016 and Ito and Vézina, 2016).14 Japan’s domestic value-added content is the
highest among the three countries in the beginning of 2000’s, accounted for 90% of exports, but
14Kee and Tang (2016) show that China’s domestic value-added contents are increasing over the period 2000-
2007 using firm-level data from China. Ito and Vézina (2016) also find that China’s final goods include a smaller
share of foreign value-added than those produced in other Asian countries using the data from 1990 and 2005.
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Figure 3: Domestic Value-Added Content in Exports by Destination Country
Panel A: The U.S.
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Panel C: Japan
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Notes: The figure displays the domestic value-added content relative to the country’s aggregate final good
export by destination country.
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Figure 4: Domestic Value-Added Contents in Exports and the Employment Effects of Exports
Panel A: The U.S. Panel B: China
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Panel C: Japan
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Notes: The figure shows relationships between the domestic value-added content in exports and the employment
effect of a million dollar aggregate exports using cross-sectional country-level observations from 2014.
it is rapidly declining during the period 2000-2014. This swift decline in domestic value-added
contents in Japan is due to deepening backward linkages with foreign countries and increase in
imported inputs.15 There is a temporary increase in the domestic value-added contents due to
the Great Trade Collapse in 2008-09 but it is declining after the crisis. As a result, the domestic
value-added content is almost 70-80% in 2014, which is the lowest among the three countries.
Figure 4 shows a cross-sectional relationship between the employment effect of exports per
value of exports — in the vertical axis — and the domestic value-added contents in exports
— in the horizontal axis. There is a positive association between the two variables regardless
the choice of estimation approaches for the U.S. and China (see Panels A and B). However, for
Japan, the two domestic value-added contents based on Timmer et al. and Johnson-Noguera
are different. This is probably due to the fact that destination countries of final good exports
15See Appendix for backward and forward linkages with other WIOD countries.
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and intermediate good exports are very different for Japan.16
To summarize, Figure 2 shows that domestic value-added contents vary across sectors, which
implies that sectoral composition in aggregate exports must have an important implication on
cross-country differences in the employment effect of exports. Furthermore, there seem to be a
relationship between the employment effect of exports and domestic value-added contents based
on time-series variations (see Figures 1 and 3) and cross-sectional relationships (see Figure 4).
In order to confirm that there are such relationships, we rely on statistical methods.
Country-level regressions: We first estimate a regression using country-level data. It
regresses natural log of employment effect of aggregate exports from country i to country j
divided by the value of aggregate exports from country i to country j,
ln
(∑N
s=1 L
(i,s),j
t |(i,All),j/∑Ns=1 d(i,s),jt ) on the share of domestic value-added to aggregate final
good exports from country i to country j, DV AX i,jt . Therefore, our regression equation is:
ln
∑Ns=1 L(i,s),jt |(i,All),j∑N
s=1 d
(i,s),j
t
 = αi,j + αt + α1DV AX i,jt + i,jt , (7)
for exporting country i = USA, CHN , and JPN , where j denote destination country; αi,j
indicates destination country fixed effects controlling for all time-invariant factors in each cross-
sectional observation; αt denotes year fixed effects controlling for macroeconomic shocks; i,jt is
the error term; and α1 is a parameter to be estimated.
Country-sector level regressions: The data are available at the country-sector level.
Therefore, we also estimate a regression by exploiting country-sector variations. The dependent
variable is natural log of country-sector level employment effect resulting from total exports
of country i to country j, ln
(
L
(i,s)
t |(i,All),j
)
. Explanatory variables include natural log of final
good exports from country j’s sector s to country j, ln
(
d
(i,s),j
t
)
, final good exports from other
sectors in country i to country j, ln
(∑N
r 6=s d
(i,r),j
t
)
; and variables capturing domestic value-added
contents estimated using the two approaches based on Timmer et al. and Johnson-Noguera.
16For example, Japan exports a greater value of intermediate goods to countries such as Taiwan, Indonesia
and Korea but final good exports to these countries are probably proportionally less than intermediate inputs.
As a result, the measure based on Johnson-Noguera, taking intermediate good flows into account, implies greater
domestic value-added contents for these countries.
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As a result, the regression equation is:17
ln
(
L
(i,s)
t |(i,All),j
)
= β(i,s),j + βt + β1 ln
(
d
(i,s),j
t
)
+ β2 ln
 N∑
r 6=s
d
(i,r),j
t
+ XDV AX′t β3 + e(i,s),jt , (8)
for exporting country i = USA, CHN , and JPN , where s and j denote source sector and
destination country, respectively; β(i,s),j are source sector-destination country fixed effects; βt
denotes year fixed effects controlling for macroeconomic shocks including changes in price levels;
and e(i,s),jt is the error term; β1, β2, and β3 are (scalars and a vector of) coefficients to be
estimated. XDV AXt is a vector of variables measuring domestic value-added contents in exports.
Table 8 reports results from estimating equation (7) where regressions in Panels A and B
use the domestic value-added content variables based on Timmer et al., DV AXT , and Johnson-
Noguera, DV AXJN , respectively. The results are similar between the two panels. Odd number
columns regress the employment effect of exports on the total domestic value-added share in
exports and even number columns break down the DV AX into ones coming from the natural
resource sector, the textile sector, and the service sector. Almost all of estimated coefficients
for DV AX are positive and statistically significant. For example, according to Pane A, a 1%
increase in DV AX raises the employment effect by 3.84%, 5.27%, and 2.02% in the U.S., China,
and Japan, respectively. Column (2) of Panel A shows that the domestic value-added content
from the service sector has the largest coefficient for the U.S. Columns (4) and (5) show that
domestic value-added contents from natural resource sector has the largest coefficient in China
and Japan.
Results from regressions with country-sector level are shown in Table 9. Because the unit
of observations is source sector-destination country, we cannot include separate sectoral value-
added variables. We introduce two control variables — the values of exports from sector s,
ln
(
d
(i,s),j
t
)
, and exports from other sectors besides sector s, ln
(∑N
r 6=s d
(i,r),j
t
)
. Both of these
coefficients have statistically significant and positive coefficients in all columns. In addition,
the result shows that the employment effect of exports is greater in sectors with greater domestic
value-added contents. According to regressions usingDV AXT reported in odd number columns,
a 1% increase in the share of domestic value-added contents in exports raises the employment
effect by 1.2%, 5.1%, and 0.9% in the U.S., China, and the U.S., respectively. Even number
columns show results usingDV AXJN . These suggest that a 1% increase in the share of domestic
17The dependent variable for equation (7) is the employment effect of final good exports per final good exports
while it is the employment effect of exports in (8). We use the per export employment effect in the regressions
with the country level data because estimating an equation like (8) using the country-level data leads to an
over-fitting. This is because, at the country level observations, a large part of the cross-country variations in the
employment effect of exports is explained by the size of exports. On the other hand, at the country-sector level
data, the dependent variable is employment effect generated by exports from all sectors in the country on each
sector s of the country. Therefore, we are supposed to have two explanatory variables measuring exports from
the country — the one is exports from sector s and the other is exports from other sectors besides s. Therefore,
the employment effect of exports instead of the per export employment effect is used as dependent variable in
(8).
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Table 8: DV AX and the Employment Effect of Exports with Country-level Data, Dep. Var. =
ln
(∑N
s=1 L
(i,s),j
t |(i,All),j∑N
s=1 d
(i,s),j
t
)
, Natural log of Employment Effect of Exports per Million Dollar Exports
Panel A: DV AX based on Timmer et al.
Exporter The U.S. China Japan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV AXT 3.839*** 5.269*** 2.019***
(0.903) (0.633) (0.349)
DV AXT , natural resource 2.206** 4.494*** 4.128***
(0.821) (0.504) (0.940)
DV AXT , manufacturing 2.952*** 1.443*** 1.322***
(0.764) (0.495) (0.289)
DV AXT , textile 1.343 1.397*** 3.177**
(2.048) (0.242) (1.340)
DV AXT , services 3.073*** 3.950*** 1.758***
(0.706) (0.371) (0.270)
Destination country fixed effects X X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X X
R-squared 0.957 0.960 0.991 0.997 0.968 0.973
# of countries 42 42 42 42 42 42
# of observations 630 630 630 630 630 630
Panel B: DV AX based on Johnson-Noguera
Exporter The U.S. China Japan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV AXJN 3.380** 2.967*** 0.540**
(1.454) (0.439) (0.229)
DV AXJN , natural resource 2.884** 2.441*** 3.832***
(1.386) (0.612) (0.838)
DV AXJN , manufacturing 3.094** 0.649 0.401*
(1.466) (0.773) (0.212)
DV AXJN , textile -0.912 2.142*** 0.851***
(2.812) (0.404) (0.307)
DV AXJN , services 3.159** 1.631*** 0.482**
(1.433) (0.535) (0.206)
Destination country fixed effects X X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X X
R-squared 0.919 0.921 0.977 0.980 0.961 0.964
# of countries 42 42 42 42 42 42
# of observations 630 630 630 630 630 630
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses. The sample period is 2000-2014. All regressions include
a constant term, destination country fixed effects, and year fixed effects. DV AX is the share of domestic value-
added contents to aggregate final good exports. For example, if DV AX takes a value of 0.20, it means that
domestic value-added contents account for 20% of aggregate final good exports.
value-added contents in exports raises the employment effect by 2.2%, 7.7%, and 1.5% in the
U.S., China, and the U.S., respectively.
To summarize, we show that the employment effect of exports is associated with the domestic
value-added contents of exports. The positive association is confirmed by observing time-series
and cross-sectional variations in the employment effect of exports and the domestic value-added
contents and by running regressions. To be fair, it is not surprising to see a positive association
because these two are estimated using similar input-output methods. We further attempt to
23
Table 9: DV AX and the Employment Effect of Exports with Country-Sector level Data, Dep.
Var. = ln
(∑N
s=1 L
(i,s),j
t |(i,All),j
)
, Natural log of Employment Effect of Exports
Exporter The U.S. China Japan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln
(
d
(i,s),j
t
)
0.113*** 0.099*** 0.187*** 0.176*** 0.091*** 0.085***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
ln
(∑N
r 6=s d
(i,r),j
t
)
0.063*** 0.068*** 0.195*** 0.198*** 0.087*** 0.088***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
DV AX, Timmer et al. 1.199*** 5.114*** 0.914***
(0.251) (0.833) (0.259)
DV AX, Johnson-Noguera 2.158*** 7.740*** 1.495***
(0.266) (0.627) (0.236)
Destination country fixed effects X X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X X
R-squared 0.285 0.314 0.417 0.434 0.218 0.230
# of country-sector pairs 2,352 2,352 2,352 2,352 2,352 2,352
# of observations 35,280 35,280 35,280 35,280 35,280 35,280
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the country-sector level, are in parentheses. The sample period is 2000-2014. All
regressions include a constant term, destination country fixed effects, and year fixed effects. DV AX denotes
the share of domestic value-added contents to aggregate final good exports. For example, if DV AX takes a
value of 0.20, it means that domestic value-added contents account for 20% of aggregate final good exports.
understand how the employment effects of exports are determined by sectoral composition in
exports and backward/forward linkages.
Sectoral export shares are calculated as the share of exports of sector s of country i to
country j to total exports from country i to country j:
EX(Res)i,jt ≡ x(i,Resource),jt /
N∑
s=1
x
(i,s),j
t ,
EX(Tex)i,jt ≡ x(i,Textile),jt /
N∑
s=1
x
(i,s),j
t ,
EX(Ser)i,jt ≡ x(i,Service),jt /
N∑
s=1
x
(i,s),j
t ,
where x(i,s),jt denotes the final and intermediate good flows from sector s of country i to country
j. Instead of the share of exports from manufacturing sectors as a whole, we use the share of
textile exports because it appears to be related with employment effects of exports in China.18
Sectoral linkages are measured using variables constructed based on Rasmussen (1956). We use
coefficients θ(i,s),(j,r)t — measuring sectoral linkages from in country i’s sector s to country j’s
sector r — to construct forward/backward linkages. The coefficients come from the following
18The share of exports from other manufacturing sectors is omitted due to perfect multicollinearity.
24
matrix:
(I−At)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C×N)×(C×N)
=

θ
(1,1),(1,1)
t θ
(1,1),(1,2)
t . . . θ
(1,1),(j,r)
t . . . θ
(1,1),(C,N)
t
θ
(1,2),(1,1)
t θ
(1,2),(1,2)
t . . . θ
(1,2),(j,r)
t . . . θ
(1,2),(C,N)
t
... ... . . . ... . . . ...
θ
(i,s),(1,1)
t θ
(i,s),(1,2)
t . . . θ
(i,s),(j,r)
t . . . θ
(i,s),(C,N)
t
... ... . . . ... . . . ...
θ
(C,N),(1,1)
t θ
(C,N),(1,2)
t . . . θ
(C,N),(j,r)
t . . . θ
(C,N),(C,N)
t

.
The forward linkage measure is
FLi,jt ≡
N∑
s=1
GOi,st∑N
s=1GO
i,s
t
N∑
r=1
θ
(i,s),(j,r)
t ,
which is a weighted average of the sectoral forward linkage with destination country j,∑Nr=1 θ(i,s),(j,r)t
where the weights are the share of country i’s sector s’s gross production GOi,st /
∑N
s=1GO
i,s
t
obtained from the WIOD SEA database. The backward linkage is constructed as:
BLi,jt ≡
N∑
s=1
GOi,st∑N
s=1GO
i,s
t
N∑
r=1
θ
(j,r),(i,s)
t .
The regression equation is therefore:
ln
∑Ns=1 L(i,s),jt |(i,All),j∑N
s=1 d
(i,s),j
t
 = γi,j + γt + γ1FLi,jt + γ2BLi,jt (9)
+γ3EX(Res)i,jt γ4EX(Tex)i,jt + γ5EX(Ser)i,jt + ui,jt ,
where γi,j indicates destination country fixed effects; γt denotes year fixed effects; ui,jt is the
error term; and γ1 − γ5 are parameters to be estimated. This equation is estimated for each of
the three exporters, the U.S., China, and Japan. We expect the coefficient for forward linkages
to be positive because it would lead to a greater input demand from foreign countries. One
may expect the coefficient for backward linkages to be negative because greater inputs from
abroad reduce domestic value-added contents. However, the direction of the effect is nontrivial.
For instance, Feng, Li, and Swenson (2016) find that an increase in intermediate good imports
in China increased China’s exports due to quality upgrading caused by better intermediate
inputs. If there are such channels, deeper backward linkages may increase the employment
effect of exports. Sectoral export shares in the natural resource, textile, and service sectors
are expected to have positive signs because these sectors have greater domestic value-added
contents.19
19See Johnson and Noguera (2012), for the case in the U.S., Koopman, Z. Wang, and Wei (2012), Ma, Z.
Wang, and Zhu (2015), and Xikang et al. (2012), for the case in China.
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Table 10: Determinants of the Employment Effect of Exports, with Country-level Data, Dep.
Var. = ln
(∑N
s=1 L
(i,s),j
t |(i,All),j∑N
s=1 d
(i,s),j
t
)
, the Employment Effect of Exports per Million Dollar Exports
Exporter The U.S. China Japan
Full Outliers Full Outliers Full Outliers
sample dropped sample dropped sample dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forward linkages, FLi,jt 2.561* 2.525* -0.588 -0.518 0.235 0.230
(1.508) (1.485) (0.704) (0.710) (0.291) (0.413)
[0.107] [0.105] [-0.025] [-0.022] [0.010] [0.010]
Backward linkages, BLi,jt 1.580 4.069 0.967 0.530 -0.916 -5.137***
(2.042) (7.910) (2.470) (2.547) (1.227) (0.997)
[0.011] [0.029] [0.007] [0.004] [-0.006] [-0.036]
Resource export share, EX(Res)i,jt 0.249 0.260 1.326*** 1.311** 0.877 0.770
(0.161) (0.167) (0.483) (0.491) (0.554) (0.515)
Textile export share, EX(Tex)i,jt 1.266 1.042 1.006*** 1.050*** 0.394*** 0.643***
(0.908) (1.040) (0.124) (0.125) (0.122) (0.181)
Service export share, EX(Ser)i,jt 0.395** 0.422** 0.680*** 0.673*** 0.089* 0.081*
(0.178) (0.186) (0.094) (0.095) (0.046) (0.046)
Destination country fixed effects X X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X X
# of destination countries 42 40 42 41 42 39
# of observations 630 600 630 615 630 585
R-squared 0.920 0.920 0.979 0.979 0.961 0.963
F -stat. 1.40 1.53 26.01 26.57 4.24 8.46
p-val. (F -stat.) 0.244 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
Notes: China and Russia are dropped as outliers in (2). Russia is dropped as an outlier in (4). China, Taiwan,
and Latvia are dropped as outliers in (6). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, are in rounded parentheses. Numbers
in square brackets are the impact of a one standard deviation change. If EX(Res)i,jt = 0.33, for example, the
natural resource exports account for 33% of the total exports.
Table 10 presents results from estimating equation (9). Forward linkages are positively
related with the employment effect of exports in the U.S. and backward linkages have a negative
effect in Japan. There is no statistically significant relationship between production linkages in
the employment effect in China. The sectoral export shares have a greater explanatory power.
For example, for the U.S., greater resource exports and greater service exports are related with
the greater employment effect of exports — according to column (2), a 1% point increase in
the service export share raises the employment effect by 0.42%.
Column (4) shows that greater exports from the resource, textile, and service sectors are
associated with greater employment effects in China. The magnitudes are sizable — a 1%
point increase in the resource export share, the textile share, and the service share raises the
employment effect by 1.31%, 1.05%, and 0.67%, respectively. Previous studies find that China’s
textile sector has a greater domestic value added content compared with other sectors in China
(e.g., Koopman, Z. Wang, and Wei, 2012; Ma, Z. Wang, and Zhu, 2015).20 Xikang et al.
20Koopman, Z. Wang, and Wei (2012) find that, using the data from 2007 and by taking processing and
non-processing trade into consideration, domestic value added contents account for 82.4% of gross production
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Figure 5: Employment Effects of Exports and Sectoral Composition of Exports
Part I: The U.S.
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Part II: China
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Part III: Japan
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Notes: The figure displays the relationship between the employment effect of a million dollar aggregate exports
and sectoral composition of total exports in 2014. Linear regression lines are in all panels.
(2012) estimate domestic value added contents in Chinese exports and show that, using the
in China’s textile industry while the overall average in China is 60.6%. Ma, Z. Wang, and Zhu (2015) further
distinguish foreign-owned and state-owned enterprises to estimate domestic value-added contents and show that
these figure become 81.2% and 59.2%, respectively. These two studies show that domestic value-added contents
are greater in the textile sector than other sectors in China.
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data from 2002, domestic value-added contents account for 81.7% and 57.2% of final demand
in the agriculture and the textile sectors while the country average is 46.6%. Results from
column (6) suggest that the textile export share and the service export share are related with
the greater employment effect of exports in Japan but the magnitude is smaller compared with
China.
Figure 5 shows cross-sectional relationships between the employment effect of a million dollar
exports and sectoral composition of total (final and intermediate goods) exports, focusing on
the natural resource, textile and service sectors. Panel B of Part II shows that, in China, there
is a striking positive correlation between the employment creation effect of exports and the
share of exports from the textile industry. It clearly explains the reason why Russia has by far
the largest employment effect of exports on China — because the majority of Chinese exports
to Russia come from the textile industry. Because producing textiles is labor-intensive and
there are not much GVCs in producing textiles, exports from the textile industry has a greater
employment effect in China. On the other hand, in the U.S. and Japan, the employment effect
of exports is positively associated with exports from the service sector (see Panel C of Panels
I and III). Interestingly, these results suggest that a country’ level of development is related
with which sectors are important in creating jobs in the country.
4 Decomposing the Employment Effect of Exports
The previous analysis suggests that the employment effect of exports is in large part ex-
plained by domestic value-added content of exports. This section investigates through which
channels the employment effects of exports change over time. In so doing we decompose changes
in the employment effect into changes in (1) the labor-to-gross output ratio represented in Λt,
(2) input-output linkages captured byAt, and (3) the sectoral composition in final good exports
in Dt. We decompose aggregate final good exports of a country because now we are interested
in understanding why the employment effects of final demand change over time rather than
their cross-sectional differences across destination countries.
We use a general C-country and N -sector case in this section. The employment effect of
final good exports from country i to country j on country i’s employment is estimated as:21
L(i,All),−it ≡ Λt(I−At)−1D∗(i,All),−it , (10)
21Employment effect equation (10) looks different from equation (1). However, these two equations lead to
the exact same employment effect if they focus on the same destination countries. Equation (10) is so-called the
demand-side analysis (Los, Timmer, and Vries, 2015; Feenstra and Sasahara, 2019). Equation (1) is so-called
the hypothetical extraction (Los, Timmer, and Vries, 2016). We use the demand-side expression here because
it makes it easier to decompose the employment effect into several components.
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where
D∗(i,All),−it︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C×N)×1
≡

0
...
0∑C
k 6=i d
i,k
t
0
...
0

and di,jt︸︷︷︸
N×1
≡

d(i,1),jt
d(i,2),jt
...
d(i,S),jt
 ,
where superscript “(i, All),−i” indicates that it is an impact of country i’s aggregate (All)
exports to all countries besides country i, denoted by −i. The vector D∗(i,All),−it consists of
a number C of sub-matrices where all sub-matrices except for one sub-matrix are replaced
with zero matrices 0. Final good flows from country i to all other countries besides country
i is inserted to the remaining sub-matrix. Resulting employment effect of final demand from
countries −i is a (C ×N)× 1 vector:
[
L1t |(i,All),−i L2t |(i,All),−i . . . LCt |(i,All),−i
]′
,
where Lit|(i,All),−i is anN×1 vector and this is the one we are interested, the employment effect of
final demand from countries −i to country i on country i. The employment effect is then divided
by final demand flows to find the employment effect per final demand as in the previous section:
(Lit|(i,All),−i)′i/(di,−it )′i where i is an N × 1 vector of ones. We examine why the employment
effect of final demand from foreign countries −i per final demand (Lit|(i,All),−i)′i/(di,−it )′i change
over time since the earliest year of the data, 2000. Therefore we choose 2000 as the benchmark
year.
The employment effect of aggregate final good exports is decomposed to three components
as follows:
L(i,All),−i2000,t |Labor ratio ≡ Λt(I−A2000)−1D∗(i,All),−i2000 , (11)
L(i,All),−i2000,t |Input-output ≡ Λ2000(I−At)−1D∗(i,All),−i2000 , (12)
L(i,All),−i2000,t |Sectoral composition ≡ Λ2000(I−A2000)−1D˜∗(i,All),−it . (13)
In the first equation, only the labor-to-output ratios Λt are allowed to change over time
while other components are fixed at the 2000 level. Estimated employment effect per ex-
ports (Lit|Labor ratio(i,All),−i )′i/(di,−it )′i measures the employment effect of exports driven by a change
in labor-to-gross output ratios Λt. In the second equation, only the input-output matrix At
is allowed to change over time while other components are fixed at the 2000 level. Therefore
(Lit|Input-output(i,All),−i )′i/(di,−it )′i quantifies the employment effect of exports driven by a change in the
input-output linkages. In the last equation, we quantify the impact of a change in sectoral
composition in final good exports captured in D˜∗(i,All),−it , which fixes the total value of final
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good flows from a country to another but the sectoral shares are taken from current year t
and compute final good flows according to the sectoral share of final good flows.22 In the last
equation, the sectoral composition in final good exports captured in D˜∗(i,All),−it are allowed
change over time while other components are fixed at the 2000 level. Overall changes in the
employment effect of exports are the one allowing all of these three components to vary over
time:
L(i,All),−i2000,t |Overall ≡ Λt(I−At)−1D˜∗(i,All),−it . (14)
Note that time-series changes in the employment effects (11)-(14) are not influenced by changes
in prices.23 We compute the cumulative rate of change in each component of the employment
effect of aggregate final good exports per value of final good exports since year 2000.
The computed cumulative rates of change are shown in Figure 6 where panels A, B, and C
present the results for the U.S., China, and Japan as an exporter, respectively. It shows that
overall employment effect of exports declined by about 30% over the period 2000-2014 in the
U.S. Changes in all of the three components worked to reduce the employment effect. Among
the three, a decline in the labor-to-output ratio explained the largest part of the overall decline
in the employment effect of exports. The declining labor shares are consistent with previous
findings (e.g., Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin, 2013). Changes in input-output linkages explain the
second largest part of the overall decline in the employment effect of exports.
Panel B shows decomposition results for China as an exporter. Changes in sectoral com-
position in final good exports and the labor-to-output ratio worked to reduce the employment
effect of exports while changes in input-output linkages increased the employment effect of
exports. China’s forward linkages are deepening during the period 2000-2014 and its backward
linkages declining after 2005. These changes are responsible for rising employment effects of
exports.24 Because the former negative effect is greater than the positive effect of the latter,
the overall employment effect of exports decreased by 60% over the period 2000-2014.
Panel C displays results for Japan. There is not clear long-run trend for Japan. The
observation from 2014 shows that the overall employment effect of exports declined by 5% in
Japan and changes in the labor-to-output ratio and input-output linkages are responsible for
this declining employment effect of exports and there is almost no change in the employment
effect due to changes in sectoral composition of exports.
The results from input-output linkages are consistent with increasing forward linkages in
China and declining forward linkages in the U.S. and Japan (see Appendix). Declining em-
22See Appendix for further details.
23Current labor-to-output ratios in Λt are found by using current labor force and current real gross output at
the 2010 price. Entries in the current input-output matrix At are input-to-output ratios so these are unaffected
by changes in prices. Also, we keep the total value of gross exports in D˜∗(i,All),−it fixed at the 2000 level and
only sectoral compositions are allowed to change. As a result, time-series changes in the employment effects
(11)-(14) are not influenced by changes in prices.
24Note that this paper estimates the number of employment generated per exports, and not the overall number
of employment generated by exports as in Ito (2018). Deepening forward and backward linkages may increase
the overall number of jobs, but it can have different impacts on the number of employment per exports.
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Figure 6: Decomposing the Employment Effects of Exports
Panel A: The U.S. Panel B: China
Labor−to−gross output ratio
Input−output linkages
Sectoral composition
Overall
−
30
−
20
−
10
0
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 ra
te
 o
f c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 2
00
0,
 p
er
ce
nt
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
Labor−to−gross output ratio
Input−output linkages
Sectoral composition
Overall
−
60
−
40
−
20
0
20
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 ra
te
 o
f c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 2
00
0,
 p
er
ce
nt
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
Panel C: Japan
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Notes: The figure shows the cumulative rate of change in the employment effect of exports estimated using
(11)-(13), decomposing the employment effect of aggregate final good exports, and the overall effect (14). The
sum of the three decomposed effects indicated by dashed lines does not necessarily equal the overall effect.
ployment effects of exports due to changes in sectoral composition in exports in China are
presumably due to increasing manufacturing exports which contain foreign value-added. On
the other hand, changes in sectoral composition in exports have a small influence on the em-
ployment effect of exports in the U.S. and Japan. Japan reacted to the Great Trade Collapse in
2008-09 by changing the labor-to-output ratio. It increased sharply in 2009 and then declined
in 2010, then went back to the pre-crisis level in 2011. Input-output linkages declined slightly
due to the crisis but it went back to the pre-crisis level in a few years. These observations are
consistent with previous empirical research showing that Japan’s trade in parts and components
revived quickly after the crisis (e.g., Ando and Kimura, 2012; Okubo, Kimura, and Teshima,
2014).25
25Ando and Kimura (2012) find that trade in parts and components declined from 2007 to 2008 due to Global
Financial Crisis but it quickly recovered from 2008 to 2009, suggesting the production networks in East Asia
are stable. Okubo, Kimura, and Teshima (2014) also find that Japanese exports in parts and components to
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5 Conclusions
This paper has examined the employment effect of exports by comparing employment effects
generated by the same value of exports from three countries, the U.S., China, and Japan. We
go beyond the existing literature by highlighting the new fact that the employment effects per
exports vary greatly depending upon destination countries. The results suggest that final good
exports from natural resource, some manufacturing sectors such as textile, and service sectors
create more jobs per dollar. Therefore, sectoral compositions of exports explain a large part of
variations in the employment effects of exports across destination countries.
The results suggest several implications. First, a recent trend in expanding GVCs across
countries may work to increase or decrease the employment effect of trade because an expansion
of GVCs works in different directions sometimes, depending upon how forward and backward
linkages change. Second, as suggested in the literature on value added in trade (e.g., Johnson
and Noguera, 2012; Johnson, 2014), gross export values are not identical to value added in trade.
Therefore, policy discussions based on gross exports would lead to a misleading conclusion. The
same logic applies to the employment effect of exports. A greater value of gross exports does
not necessarily mean a greater employment effect. Third, as suggested in Baldwin, Ito, and
Sato (2014), value-added contents in exports have implications on geographical location of
‘good’ jobs with higher value-added and ‘bad’ jobs with lower value-added. Therefore, different
value-added contents in trade may have a large impact on wages.
Lastly, we once again acknowledge that the input-output analysis employed in this paper
focuses on the demand-side of the labor market. In a counterfactual employment we consider
a hypothetical situation that final demands from foreign countries are zero, which would affect
the supply-side of the labor market therefore alter equilibrium wages and employment. Since
we do not attempt to close the model and rely on the demand-side only, the employment effect
of exports may be different from the one taking general equilibrium feedbacks into account as
in Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro (2015). These considerations are left for further investigation.
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Appendix
A Dataset
This section summarizes details on the global input-output table from the WIOD (Timmer, Diet-
zenbacher, et al., 2015; Timmer et al., 2016).
A.1 List of Countries
The list of 44 economies in the WIOD global input-output table is as follows.
Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Brazil (BRA), Bulgaria (BGR), Canada
(CAN), China (CHN), Croatia (HRV), Cyprus (CYP), Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark
(DNK), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC),
Hungary (HUN), India (IDN), Indonesia (IND), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN),
Republic of Korea (KOR), Latvia (LVA), Lithuania (LTU), Luxembourg (LUX), Malta
(MLT), Mexico (MEX), Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Poland (POL), Portugal
(PRT), Romania (ROU), Russia (RUS), Slovak Republic (SVK), Slovenia (SVN), Spain
(ESP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), Taiwan (TWN), Turkey (TUR), United King-
dom (GBR), United States (USA) and the rest of the world (ROW)
A.2 List of WIOD Sectors
Each country in the WIOD input-output table is comprised of 56 sectors. The list of the sectors
is as follows. It also shows aggregation of the 56 sectors.
Table A1: WIOD 56 Sectors
# WIOD Sectors Aggregation 1 Aggregation 2
1 Crop and animal production, hunting Natural resources Animals, fish, and forestry
2 Forestry and logging Natural resources Animals, fish, and forestry
3 Fishing and aquaculture Natural resource Animals, fish, and forestries
4 Mining and quarrying Natural resources Mining and quarrying
5 Manufacture of food products Manufacturing Food manufacturing
6 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel Manufacturing Textile, wood, and paper
7 Manufacture of wood Manufacturing Textile, wood, and paper
8 Manufacture of paper and paper products Manufacturing Textile, wood, and paper
9 Printing and reproduction of recorded media Manufacturing Material manufacturing
10 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products Manufacturing Material manufacturing
11 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products Manufacturing Material manufacturing
12 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products Manufacturing Material manufacturing
13 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products Manufacturing Material manufacturing
14 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products Manufacturing Material manufacturing
15 Manufacture of basic metals Manufacturing Material manufacturing
16 Manufacture of fabricated metal products Manufacturing Material manufacturing
17 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products Manufacturing Electronics
18 Manufacture of electrical equipment Manufacturing Electronics
19 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. Manufacturing Electronics
20 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers Manufacturing Electronics
21 Manufacture of other transport equipment Manufacturing Electronics
22 Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing Manufacturing Electronics
A1
WIOD 56 Sectors, continued
# WIOD Sectors Aggregation 1 Aggregation 2
23 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment Services Construction and infra.
24 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply Services Construction and infra.
25 Water collection, treatment and supply Services Construction and infra.
26 Sewerage; waste collection, treatment and disposal activities Services Construction and infra.
27 Construction Services Construction and infra.
28 Wholesale and retail trade and repair services Services Wholesale and retail
29 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles Services Wholesale and retail
30 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles Services Wholesale and retail
31 Land transport and transport via pipelines Services Transportation
32 Water transport Services Transportation
33 Air transport Services Transportation
34 Warehousing and support activities for transportation Services Transportation
35 Postal and courier activities Services Transportation
36 Accommodation and food service activities Services Transportation
37 Publishing activities Services Transportation
38 Motion picture, video and television programme production Services Transportation
39 Telecommunications Services Transportation
40 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities Services Transportation
41 Financial service activities Services Finance
42 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding Services Finance
43 Activities auxiliary to financial services Services Finance
44 Real estate activities Services Professional services
45 Legal and accounting activities; activities of head offices Services Professional services
46 Architectural and engineering activities Services Professional services
47 Scientific research and development Services Professional services
48 Advertising and market research Services Professional services
49 Other professional, scientific and technical activities Services Professional services
50 Administrative and support service activities Services Professional services
51 Public administration and defence Services Professional services
52 Education Services Professional services
53 Human health and social work activities Services Professional services
54 Other service activities Services Professional services
55 Activities of households as employers Services Professional services
56 Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies Services Professional services
Notes: Aggregation 1 is used in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10. The textile sector in Tables 8 and 10 are WIOD sector
6. Aggregation 2 is employed in Figure 2.
A.3 List of Final Demand Categories
In the final demand matrix, each of the destination countries consist of five final demand categories:
· Final consumption expenditure by households
· Final consumption expenditure by non-profit organizations serving households (NPISH)
· Final consumption expenditure by government
· Gross fixed capital formation
· Changes in inventories and valuables
In input-output calculation, we compute the sum of these.
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B Summary Statistics
Summary statistics of the country level and the country-sector level samples are presented in
Tables A2 and A3, respectively.
Table A2: Summary Statistics of the Country Level Sample
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
ln
(∑N
s=1 L
(i,s)
t |(i,All),j
)
1,890 3.361 2.610 -4.502 10.112
ln
(∑N
s=1 d
(i,s),j
t
)
1,890 7.116 2.126 0 12.317
ln
(∑N
s=1 L
(i,s)
t |(i,All),j∑N
s=1 d
(i,s),j
t
)
1,890 3.152 1.397 1.286 6.784
DV AXT , total 1,890 0.836 0.057 0.598 0.961
DV AXT , natural resource 1,890 0.053 0.049 0.003 0.218
DV AXT , manufacturing 1,890 0.460 0.092 0.105 0.628
DV AXT , textile 1,890 0.032 0.049 0 0.356
DV AXT , services 1,890 0.323 0.127 0.167 0.840
DV AXJN , total 1,890 0.835 0.062 0.639 0.968
DV AXJN , natural resource 1,890 0.062 0.057 0.003 0.428
DV AXJN , manufacturing 1,890 0.413 0.113 0.034 0.622
DV AXJN , textile 1,890 0.024 0.037 0 0.316
DV AXJN , services 1,890 0.360 0.158 0.169 0.921
Forward linkages 1,890 0.038 0.042 0.003 0.260
Backward linkages 1,890 0.004 0.007 0 0.058
Resource export share 1,890 0.026 0.051 0 0.577
Manufacturing export share 1,890 0.713 0.226 0.009 1
Textile export share 1,890 0.056 0.096 0 0.803
Service export share 1,890 0.205 0.228 0 0.982
Notes: ln
(∑S
s=1 L
(i,s)
t |(i,All),j
)
denotes natural log of employment effect of country i’s aggregate exports
to country j on country i. ln
(∑S
s=1 d
(i,s),j
t
)
is natural log of aggregate final good exports from country i
to country j. ln
(∑N
s=1 L
(i,s)
t |(i,All),j∑N
s=1 d
(i,s),j
t
)
denotes the employment effect of exports from country i to country
j on country i per million dollar exports. DV AXT and DV AXJN indicate the share of domestic
contents in exports to aggregate final good exports based on Timmer et al. and Johnson-Noguera,
respectively. The variable of the manufacturing export share does not include textile exports.
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Table A3: Summary Statistics of the Country-Sector Level Sample
Sample size Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
ln
(
L
(i,s)
t |(i,All),j
)
105,840 0.622 1.071 0 8.855
ln
(
d
(i,s),j
t
)
105,840 8.650 2.370 3.871 16.658
ln
(∑N
r 6=s d
(i,r),j
t
)
105,840 8.644 2.371 3.401 16.658
DV AXT 110,880 0.015 0.027 0 0.457
DV AXJN 110,880 0.015 0.025 0 0.518
FLDestination 105,840 0.025 0.066 0 2.240
FLHome 105,840 0.808 0.921 0 5.843
FLOthers 105,840 0.025 0.022 0 0.231
BLDestination 105,840 0.003 0.009 0 0.210
BLHome 105,840 0.808 0.444 0 2.143
BLOthers 105,840 0.003 0.003 0 0.016
Own Linkage 105,840 1.107 0.147 1 1.851
Capital-to-output ratio 96,390 0.014 0.019 0 0.139
Labor-to-output ratio 105,840 0.030 0.095 0 1.162
Notes: ln
(
L
(i,s)
t |(i,All),j
)
denotes natural log of employment effect of country i’s aggregate ex-
ports to country j on sector s of country i. ln
(
d
(i,s),j
t
)
is natural log of final good exports from
sector s of country i to country j. ln
(∑N
r 6=s d
(i,r),j
t
)
indicates natural log of exports from all
sectors besides sectors of country i to country j. DV AXT and DV AXJN indicate the share
of domestic contents in exports to aggregate final good exports based on Timmer et al. and
Johnson-Noguera, respectively.
A4
C Some Details on the Decomposition Exercise in Sec-
tion 4
This section explains how D˜∗(i,All),−it is found. First, we find the sectoral share of final good
exports from country i to country j at the current year t, denoted by ρi,jt :
ρi,jt =

ρ
(i,1),j
t
ρ
(i,2),j
t
...
ρ
(i,N),j
t
 =

d
(i,1),j
t /
∑N
s=1 d
(i,s),j
t
d
(i,2),j
t /
∑N
s=1 d
(i,s),j
t
...
d
(i,S),j
t /
∑N
s=1 d
(i,s),j
t
 ,
where N is the number of sectors. ρ(i,s),jt is the share of final good exports from country i’s sector s
to country j in the total exports from country i to country j. We find hypothetical final good flows
in current year t by using sectoral compositions from current year t and total export value from 2000.
This way, we keep the total export value of exports constant to the one from 2000. Therefore, final
good flows from country i to country j are found using ρi,jt and the total export values from country
i to country j in 2000. The vector we want to find is:
D˜∗(i,All),−it︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C×N)×1
=

0
...
0∑C
k 6=i d˜
i,k
2000,t
0
...
0

and d˜∗i,j2000,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
N×1
=

ρ
(i,1),j
t
∑N
k=1 d
(i,1),j
2000
ρ
(i,2),j
t
∑N
k=1 d
(i,1),j
2000
...
ρ
(i,N),j
t
∑N
k=1 d
(i,1),j
2000
 .
D Some Additional Analyses
Figure A1 displays how forward and backward linkages have evolved during 2000-2014 for the U.S.
(Panel I), China (Panel II), and Japan (Panel III). For the U.S., there is no clear trend in forward
linkages. Forward linkages to Luxembourg, Belgium, and Netherlands are increasing after 2009 but
this trend is not present with other countries. Forward linkages with most countries — shown in
the bottom of Panel A — are declining during 2000-2014. Backward linkages with other countries
are almost constant during the period with one exception: China. Backward linkages with China is
continuously increasing over time except for the period of the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis.
Panel II of Figure A1 describes forward and backward linkages for China. It shows that China’s
forward linkages with other countries are increasing over time. This is consistent with previous results
documented in Kee and Tang (2016). They find that trade and FDI liberalization in China led to
deeper input-output linkages and positive spillovers, which increased the number of available domestic
input varieties. Contrary to forward linkages, China’s backward linkages with other countries are
declining after the peak around 2004. These increasing forward linkages and declining backward
suggest that China has become an intermediate good supplier for countries in the world and it is
moving down the global supply chains.
Production linkages for Japan are shown in Panel III. Forward linkages with most countries are
constant over the period but those with major trading partners, Taiwan and Korea, are declining
after 2011. Japan’s backward linkages are slightly increasing over the period and those with China is
especially skyrocketing. Overall, time-series trends in forward and backward linkages are very different
across the three countries. We investigate how these trends in production linkages are associated with
the employment effect of exports by running regressions.
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Figure A1: Forward and Backward Linkages, 2000-2014
Panel I: The U.S.
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Panel A: Forward Linkages
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Panel B: Backward Linkages
Panel II: China
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Panel A: Forward Linkages
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Panel B: Backward Linkages
Panel III: Japan
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Panel A: Forward Linkages
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Panel B: Backward Linkages
Notes: The figure shows time-series variations in forward and backward linkages with trading partners. The
forward/backward linkage measures are based on Rasmussen (1956).
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